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Note
Chemical Castration and the Right to Generate Ideas:
Does the First Amendment Protect the Fantasies of
Convicted Pedophiles?
G.L. Stelzer*
The practice of castration' has a culturally universal and
ancient history.2 Biblical,3 mythological,4 and historical5 refer-
ences to castration indicate its popularity as a method of pun-
ishment.6 Today, the punitive characteristics of castration are
* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1995,
Northwestern University.
1. Castration is the severance of the testicles, and should not be con-
fused with "demasculinization," which refers to castration and the removal of
the penis and scrotum. Georg K. Stiirup, Castration: The Total Treatment, in
SEXUAL BEHAVIORS: SOCIAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL ASPECTS 361, 361 (H.L.P.
Resnik & Marvin E. Wolfgang eds., 1972).
2. Nikolaus Heim & Carolyn J. Hursch, Castration for Sex Offenders:
Treatment or Punishment? A Review and Critique of Recent European Litera-
ture, 8 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAv. 281, 281 (1979); Stfdrup, supra note 1, at
362; Edward S. Tauber, Effects of Castration upon the Sexuality of the Adult
Male, 2 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 74, 74 (1940).
3. See Matthew 19:12 ("[T]here are some eunuchs which were made
eunuchs of men.").
4. See Stiirup, supra note 1, at 362-63 (recounting Zeus's castration of
his father, Cronos, for swallowing his brothers).
5. See Heim & Hursch, supra note 2, at 281-82 (discussing castration as
a punishment for rape or adultery in the Middle Ages, under the doctrine of
jus talonis, or "an eye for an eye"); id. at 282 (describing castration as used to
punish sex offenders under the Nazi regime); Stiirup, supra note 1, at 363-64
(discussing castration as punishment for black men in Kansas Territory who
raped, attempted to rape, or tried to force marriage upon white women); id. at
364 (discussing castration as used to punish sex offenders under the Nazi re-
gime); Tauber, supra note 2, at 75 (discussing castration of male captives by
their conquerors).
6. Castration has served preventative purposes as well. Eastern rulers
castrated guardians of their harems as a precautionary measure. Tauber, su-
pra note 2, at 75. Eighteenth century churches tacitly sanctioned castration
to "preserve the angelic elegance of the choir-boys' voices." Id. Eugenic cas-
tration checked the reproduction of criminals, the feeble-minded, and the in-
sane. Id. at 76.
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what makes a new law so controversial. California recently en-
acted a statute7 punishing child molesters by so-called "chemical
castration,"8 a non-surgical treatment with medroxyprogesterone
acetate (MPA), a drug shown to reduce recidivism in male sex
offenders by diminishing sexual fantasies and impulses.9
Adversaries of the new California law liken MPA treat-
ment to physical castration, and consider it a barbaric form of
punishment.' ° Proponents of the measure point to MPA's suc-
cess in dramatically reducing the recidivism rate of sex offend-
ers in Europe." The statute is certain to draw judicial scru-
tiny because the nature of MPA treatment triggers several
constitutional concerns. 3 In particular, the drug's interference
7. Act of Sept. 17, 1996, ch. 596, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2711 (West)
(codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West Supp. 1997)). Although Florida and
Wisconsin have considered adding chemical treatment to their anti-pedophile
arsenals, H.B. 83, 15th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997) (unenacted), A.B. 594,
92d Leg., 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1995) (unenacted), California is the first
state to holster the syringe.
8. "Chemical castration" is a popular misnomer. In high doses, the
treatment, like surgical castration, causes impotence. See N. McConaghy et al.,
Treatment of Sex Offenders with Imaginal Desensitization and/or Medroxypro-
gesterone, 77 ACTA PsYCHIATRICA ScANDINAVIcA 199, 203-04 (1988) (suggesting
that lowering doses of MPA will prevent chemical castration).
9. See generally infra Part I.B (discussing MPA treatment).
10. See Ed Mendel, Controversial Castration Bill Sent to Governor, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 31, 1996, at Al (quoting a bill opponent arguing
that it is wrong to mutilate citizens).
11. Id. (reporting that according to the bill sponsor, the drug has cut the
recidivism rate from 90% to 2% in Europe).
12. The American Civil Liberties Union has promised a legal challenge.
Burt Herman, Calif Ready to Adopt Law for Castrating Molesters; 2-Time Of-
fenders Would Get Injection, COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Aug. 30, 1996, at 2A;
American Civil Liberties Union, September 3, 1996: Chemical Castration Law
Nears Passage; ACLU offices in California Vow Challenge (visited Apr. 13,
1997) <http://aclu.org/news/w090396a.html>.
13. This Note analyzes whether the California chemical castration statute
violates the freedom of speech. Other commentators have addressed whether
chemical castration constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, infringes upon
the right to privacy, or violates equal protection. For authors who believe that
chemical castration constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and violates
privacy rights, see William Green, Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Proba-
tion of Rape Offenders: Statutory and Constitutional Issues, 12 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 1, 20-25 (1986); John T. Melella et al., Legal and Ethical Issues in the
Use of Antiandrogens in Treating Sex Offenders, 17 BuLL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 223, 226, 227-28 (1989); Linda S. Demsky, Comment, The
Use of Depo-Provera in the Treatment of Sex Offenders, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 295,
303-09, 312-15 (1984). For authors who believe that chemical castration is not
cruel and unusual punishment, see Kenneth B. Fromson, Note, Beyond an Eye
for an Eye: Castration as an Alternative Sentencing Measure, 11 N.Y.L. SCH.
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with a sex offender's fantasy life implicates the freedom to gen-
erate ideas, a subset of the freedom of speech. 14
This Note analyzes whether the First Amendment protects
the right of convicted child molesters to fantasize about chil-
dren. Part I describes pedophilia, the administration of MPA
and its effects in men, and the substance of California's chemi-
cal castration law. Part II discusses the current state of the
First Amendment and the law of parole. Part III applies tra-
ditional First Amendment analysis to California's chemical
castration statute, demonstrates that the analytical framework
protecting communication of ideas transfers poorly to protect
the generation of ideas, and explains why application of the
law of parole fails to remedy this shortcoming. Part IV pro-
poses a new test to determine whether state programs that in-
terfere with mentation-and the concomitant right to generate
ideas-pass First Amendment muster, and applies that test to
the California provision.
I. CHEMICAL CASTRATION: AT THE INTERSECTION OF
SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND CRIMINAL SENTENCING
A. PEDOPHILIA
Pedophilia15 is a diagnosable16 psychiatric syndrome char-
acterized by sexual attraction to children or gratification from
J. HUM. RTS. 311, 326-29 (1994); Pamela K, Hicks, Comment, Castration of
Sexual Offenders, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 641, 657-60 (1993). For authors who be-
lieve chemical castration is neither cruel and unusual punishment nor viola-
live of privacy, see Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA Treat-
ment of the Sexual Offender, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 31-52 (1990); Kimberly A.
Peters, Comment, Chemical Castration: An Alternative to Incarceration, 31
DUQ. L. REV. 307, 318-25 (1993). For authors who believe that chemical cas-
tration is neither cruel and unusual punishment nor violative of privacy rights
nor violative of the Equal Protection Clause, see Daniel L. Icenogle, Sentenc-
ing Male Sex Offenders to the Use of Biological Treatments, 15 J. LEGAL MED.
279, 294-303 (1994); Dennis H. Rainear, Comment, The Use of Depo-Provera
for Treating Male Sex Offenders: A Review of the Constitutional and Medical
Issues, 16 U. TOL. L. REV. 181, 199-223 (1984)
14. See infra text accompanying notes 93-100 (outlining the argument
that the First Amendment protects the right to generate ideas). For a primer
on the right to generate ideas, see Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Psy-
chotropic Medication: Current State of the Law and Beyond, in THE RIGHT TO
ANTIPsYCHOTIC MEDICATION 7, 9-12 (David Rapoport & John Parry eds.,
1986).
15. The term "pedophilia" comes from the Greek language and literally
means "love of children." ELIZABETH RICE ALLGEIER & ALBERT RICHARD
ALLGEIER, SEXUAL INTERACTIONS 681 (3d ed. 1991). The American Psychiat-
ric Association identifies pedophilia as a subclass of paraphilias, sexual disor-
167.71997]
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sexual intimacy with them. 17 By this definition, pedophilia and
child molestation are non-coextensive concepts; pedophilia does
not account for incidents of child molestation motivated by
hallucination,' 8 mental retardation, 19 anger,20 or similar, non-
sexual causes,21 but only for behavior motivated by sexual
urges and fantasies.22  The discrete causes of pedophilia re-
ders involving "recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or
behaviors generally involving 1) nonhuman objects, 2) the suffering or hu-
miliation of oneself or one's partner, or 3) children or other nonconsenting
persons," that continue for at least six months. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 522-23
(4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
16. Pedophilia has three diagnostic criteria:
A. Over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent, intense sexually
arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving sexual activ-
ity with a prepubescent child or children (generally age 13 years or
younger).
B. The fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors cause clinically sig-
nificant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other im-
portant areas of functioning.
C. The person is at least 16 years and at least 5 years older than
the child or children in Criterion A.
DSM-IV at 528 tbl.302.2. In making an assessment, diagiiosticians typically
ask patients about their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Fred S. Berlin, Sex
Offenders: A Biomedical Perspective and a Status Report on Biomedical
Treatment, in THE SEXUAL AGGRESSOR 83, 88 (Joanne G. Greer & Irving R.
Stuart eds., 1983). Yet the syndrome can always be inferred from objective,
deviant behavior. David Finkelhor & Sharon Araji, Explanations of Pedophilia:
A Four Factor Model, 22 J. SEX RES. 145, 146-47 (1986) (offering a behavior-
based definition of pedophilia).
17. Michael Serber & Joseph Wolpe, Behavior Therapy Techniques, in
SEXUAL BEHAVIORS: SOCIAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 1, at
239, 239-40; see also Berlin, supra note 16, at 86 (distinguishing ephebophilia
from pedophilia); Finkelhor & Araji, supra note 16, at 146-47 (offering an al-
ternative definition of pedophilia). Yet no consensus has gelled as to the exact
meaning of pedophilia. See id. at 145-46 (reviewing the conflicting ways in
which pedophilia has been defined).
18. Fred S. Berlin & Carl F. Meinecke, Treatment of Sex Offenders with
Antiandrogenic Medication: Conceptualization, Review of Treatment Modali-
tites, and Preliminary Findings, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 601, 602 (1981).
19. Id. About 20% of child molesters are mentally retarded. ALLGEIER &
ALLGEIER, supra note 15, at 682.
20. Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 18, at 602; Paul A. Walker et al., Anti-
androgenic Treatment of the Paraphilias, in GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF
PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS 427, 429 (Harvey C. Stancer et al. eds., 1984).
21. Diagnosis of pedophilia may be complicated, however, where it occurs
in combination with other sexual disorders. See DSM-IV, supra note 15, at
523 (explaining that sexual preferences can meet the diagnostic criteria for
more than one paraphilia).
22. See Paul A. Walker & Walter J. Meyer III, Medroxyprogesterone Ace-
tate Treatment for Paraphiliac Sex Offenders, in VIOLENCE AND THE VIOLENT
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main unknown, but plausible theories focus on psychological
and socio-cultura 23 or biological24 explanations. Importantly,
studies demonstrate a positive correlation between the reduc-
tion of testosterone2 5 in men and the reduction of sexually de-
viant behavior, including pedophilia.
26
Pedophilic fantasies about sexual encounters with children
are persistent and recurrent.2 7 The erotic cravings that accom-
INDIIDUAL 353, 354-56 (J. Ray Hays et al. eds., 1981) (distinguishing
paraphiliac sex offenders from violent, disinhibited, or denying sex offenders).
23. Psychological and socio-cultural theories ofpedophilia generally try to
answer one of four inquiries: why a person would find it emotionally satisfying
to relate sexually to a child (emotional congruence), why a person would find
children sexually arousing (sexual arousal), why a person would be unable to
satisfy sexual and emotional needs in socially approved relationships
(blockage), and why conventional inhibitions against having sex with children
are absent or overcome in some persons (disinhibition). Finkelhor & Araji,
supra note 16, at 147-55, 147 tbl.1 (reviewing 10 years of literature on pedo-
philia and extracting four explanatory themes).
24. Biological theories of pedophilia arise from the etiology of deviant
sexual desires generally, and focus on genetic, hormonal, or neurological
anomalies. See Berlin, supra note 16, at 93-100, 93 fig.5-2, 95 fig.5-3, 95
tbl.5-3, 98 figs.5-4a & 5-4b, 101 tbl.5-4 (analyzing Klinefelter's syndrome as a
genetic condition predisposing toward pedophilia, identifying hormonal im-
balances in animals as dispositive of sexual behavior generally, and associat-
ing electroencephalographic dysfunction with pedophilia and other sexual dis-
orders). But see Finkelhor & Araji, supra note 16, at 152 ('[B]iological factors
are seen as a source of instability which may predispose a person to develop
deviant patterns of arousal [generally] .... [Hiowever, such theories, useful
as they may be for treatment, are not really specific explanations of how a
person comes to find children arousing.") (citation omitted). There is one con-
stant, however-the disorder is an almost exclusively male phenomenon.
Berlin, supra note 16, at 87; Finkelhor & Araji, supra note 16, at 146 n.1.
25. Testosterone is the primary male sex hormone. Hormones are sub-
stances released by endocrine glands and transported through the blood-
stream to other tissues where they act to regulate the functions of the target
tissue. John D. Baxter, General Concepts of Endocrinology, in BASIC &
CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY 1, 2 (Francis S. Greenspan & John D. Baxter eds.,
4th ed. 1994).
26. Jonathan R. Kelly & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Treatment of the Sexu-
ally Dangerous Patient, 21 CURRENT PSYCHIATRIC THERAPiEs 101, 102-03
(1982); McConaghy et al., supra note 8, at 203-04.
27. Berlin, supra note 16, at 88; Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 18, at 601.
One pedophile, "Mr. A.," described the irrepressibility of his fantasy:
If I have seen an exceptionally nice looking boy I get aroused....
I know I am going to start fantasizing. I have noticed that the first
thing is I drop my eyes to his genitals. It gets more intense, the fan-
tasies, that is. I dream about a South Sea island, nothing but boys on
the island .... [Sometimes] I get so aroused I just have to get it
sexually together... I know that the legal issues are, but at the
time I am not thinking of legal issues. All I can think about is getting
the boy. I want to keep doing it, and doing it, and doing it. No mat-
ter how. Getting the boy.
1997] 1679
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pany these fantasies, if left unsatisfied, frustrate the pedo-
phile.28 Although self-gratification can temporarily stay these
impulses,29 pedophiles achieve sexual relief only when they en-
act their fantasies precisely.3"
Although most pedophiles are nonviolent,31 some victims
experience significant physical32 and psychological 33 harm. Fur-
Berlin, supra note 16, at 85. Compare Humbert Humbert's fictitious confes-
sion in Lolita:
I would have the reader see "nine" and "fourteen" as the bounda-
ries-the mirrory beaches and rosy rock-of an enchanted island
haunted by those nymphets of mine and surrounded by a vast, misty
sea ....
The dimmest of my pollutive dreams was a thousand times more
dazzling than all the adultery the most virile writer of genius or the
most talented impotent might imagine....
.. Humbert Humbert tried hard to be good. Really and truly,
he did .... But how his heart beat when, among the innocent throng,
he espied a demon child, "enfant charmante et fourbe," dim eyes,
bright lips, ten years in jail if you only show her you are looking at
her.
VLADIMIR NABOKOV, LOLITA 17-20 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1992) (1955).
28. Berlin, supra note 16, at 88; Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 18, at 601.
29. See Berlin, supra note 16, at 85 (describing patient who would mas-
turbate to "cure" his arousal); Henry Fitzgerald Jr., Molester Going Back to
Prison, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Dec. 7, 1995, at 2B (describing pedo-
phile who, to fight his urges to molest boys, would wear boys' underwear while
masturbating in a child-size chair); Larry Don McQuay, The Case for Castra-
tion, Part 1, WASH. MONTHLY, May 1994, at 26, 27 (describing prisoner, who,
until he is released from prison, has sex with younger-looking men, pretend-
ing they are children while letting his imagination do the rest).
30. Berlin, supra note 16, at 88; Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 18, at 601.
Fantasy reenactment helps to explain why the pedophile's modus operandi is
stereotypical. Id. Moreover, because the pedophile has likely reinforced his
fantasy with many thousands of orgasms, the fantasy must accompany almost
every erection and ejaculation. Walker et al., supra note 20, at 429.
31. Berlin, supra note 16, at 87 (observing that pedophiles usually per-
suade, rather than coerce, their victims). The rate of physical injury may be
below nine percent. Id. (citing a Michigan study of 1252 sex offenses against
children).
32. Some pedophiles kill their victims. See, e.g., Nancy Vogel & ilana
DeBare, Polly Found Dead in Sonoma Woods, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 5, 1993,
at Al (Polly Klaas); Suspect Confessed in the Murder of a 7 Year Old, Prosecu-
tors Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1994, at B2 (Megan Kanka) [hereinafter Suspect
Confessed]; see also McQuay, supra note 29, at 26-27 (prisoner predicting that
he will rape and murder children when he is paroled, unless first castrated).
33. The child may suffer emotionally from the sexual relationship itself,
from the reactions of other adults who discover the forbidden activity, or from
self-blame when the pedophile-a person the child may like a great deal, such
as a relative-is punished. Berlin, supra note 16, at 87. Moreover, because a
positive correlation exists between sexual victimization as a child and pedo-
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thermore, the general failure of rehabilitative approaches 34
leads to high recidivism rates for pedophiles.35  Faced with
these problems, and confronted with extensive media coverage
of particular child killings by released sex offenders,36 states
are abandoning rehabilitative strategies 37 and adopting more
innovative approaches like sex offender registration and com-
munity notification laws.38  The chemical treatment of sex of-
fenders with MPA is the latest of these innovative approaches.
philia as an adult, id. at 88, there may be reason to believe that the victim will
become the predator in a reprise of the childhood experience.
34. See Lita Furby et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105
PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 27 (1989) (reviewing 42 treatment studies and concluding
that "Itihere is as yet no evidence that clinical treatment reduces rates of sex
reoffenses in general"). Generally, laws facilitating institutionalized rehabili-
tation instead of incarceration, enacted during the "buoyant therapeutic op-
timism" of the mid-twentieth century, have failed. John Q. La Fond, Washing-
ton's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic
State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655, 661, 667-69 (1992)
(outlining the history of sexual psychopath laws in comparison to the chang-
ing ideologies of the criminal justice system).
35. Whereas experts agree that the recidivism rate for untreated child
molesters is high, there is disagreement as to the precise figure. Compare
Sarah Glazer, Punishing Sex Offenders, 6 C.Q. RESEARCHER 25, 30 tbl. (1996)
(10% to 40% recidivism, according to an international study), with Herman,
supra note 12, at 2A (75% recidivism, according to Attorney General Janet
Reno). Child molesters are at significant risk of reoffending throughout their
lifetime. R. Karl Hanson et al., Long-Term Recidivism of Child Molesters, 61
J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 646, 650 (1993). Those pedophiles most
prone to recidivism, nonincestuous pedophiles targeting boys, average ap-
proximately 280 sexual crimes in their lifetime. Gene G. Able et al., Self-
Reported Sex Crimes of Nonincarcerated Paraphiliacs, 2 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 3, 15, 16 tbl.1 (1987). Moreover, there is a positive correlation be-
tween the number of sex crimes committed and the likelihood of future re-
lapse. Jorgen Ortmann, The Treatment of Sexual Offenders, 3 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 443, 443-44 (1980). For a comprehensive review of empirical
studies of sex offender recidivism, see Furby et al., supra note 34, and Gordon
C. Nagayama Hall, Sexual Offender Recidivism Revisited: A Meta-Analysis of
Recent Treatment Studies, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 802
(1995).
36. See Vogel & DeBare, supra note 32 (discussing the Polly Kaas case);
Suspect Confessed, supra note 32 (discussing the Megan Kanka case).
37. See La Fond, supra note 34, at 659-63 (explaining the abandonment of
rehabilitative strategies for sex offenders according to a shifting legislative
perception that sex offenders are not so much mentally ill as they are evil).
See, e.g., Phil Manzano, Sex Crime Program Will End, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
May 25, 1995, at B1 (reporting Oregon's decision, in the face of budget cuts
and a lock-them-up-and-throw-away-the-key mentality, to end a treatment
program that had served as a national model).
38. The federal government has spurred state activity in these areas. In
1994, President Clinton signed into law the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as
16811997]
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B. MEDROXYPROGESTERONE ACETATE
MPA39 is a synthetic progesterone compound classified
pharmacologically as an antiandrogen. ° Scientists first ob-
served that progesterone compounds inhibit male sexual drive in
1958.41 The first clinical treatment of sex offenders with MPA
followed in the 1960s.4 2 The results proved promising,4 3 and to-
day MPA treatment is no longer considered experimental."
amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.), requiring states to enact registration
laws by 1997 to retain their share of federal crime-fighting fimds, id. §
170101, 108 Stat. at 2038-42 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071), and encouraging
them to enact community notification laws, id. § 170101(d)(3), 108 Stat. at
2042 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d)(3)). More recently, the President or-
dered a nationwide computer network to track sex offenders. Memorandum
on the Development of a National Sexual Offender Registration System, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1137 (June 25, 1996); see also President's Radio
Address, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1497 (Aug. 24, 1996) (describing the
tracking system to the nation).
As of January 1996, 47 states had enacted laws requiring sex offenders to
register with local police. Glazer, supra note 35, at 28 map. The three hold-
outs, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Vermont, have since followed suit. MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 178C-1780 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
29-4001 to 29-4013 (Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5401-5413 (Supp.
1996). At least 30 states require some kind of community notification when
sex offenders move into the neighborhood. Glazer, supra note 35, at 28 map.
39. Medroxyprogesterone Acetate is manufactured by Upjohn and is sold
in the United States for intramuscular injection under the trade name Depo-
Provera. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE, 2079-84
(51st ed. 1997) In the United States, Depo-Provera contraceptive injection is
indicated only for the prevention of pregnancy. Id. at 2080. Nevertheless,
this approval does not limit the circumstances under which MPA may be ad-
ministered, Fred S. Berlin, The Paraphilias and Depo-Provera: Some Medical,
Ethical and Legal Considerations, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 233,
235 (1989), because physicians may legally prescribe approved drugs for
non-approved uses. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, 12 FDA DRUG BULL. 4, 4-5 (1981).
40. Melella et al., supra note 13, at 225. In men, antiandrogens inhibit
the release of the male hormone androgen from the testicles. Id.
41. Carl. G. Heller et al., Effects of Progestational Compounds on the Re-
productive Processes of the Human Male, 71 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 649, 660,
661 tbl.2 (1958).
42. For a discussion of the first clinical treatment of sex offenders with
MPA, see John Money, The Therapeutic Use of Androgen-Depleting Hormone,
in SEXUAL BEHAVIORS 351, 351-52 (H.L.P. Resnik & Marvin E. Wolfgang eds.,
1972) [hereinafter Money, Therapeutic Use]); John Money, Use of an Androgen-
Depleting Hormone in the Treatment of Male Sex Offenders, 6 J. SEX RESEARCH
165, 165 (1970) [hereinafter Money, Treatment].
43. For articles describing the behavioral responses to MPA and offering
a case illustration, see Money, Therapeutic Use, supra note 42, at 354-58;
Money, Treatment, supra note 42, at 167-71. MPA treatment has proven to be
superior to the traditional use of estrogen compounds, which subdued the li-
bido, but which had feminizing effects in men and could cause nausea, vomit-
1682
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MPA treatment 45 acts on the male endocrine system," de-
creasing the level of plasma testosterone47 in two ways. First,
MPA inhibits the testicular production of testosterone.5 Second,
ing, and permanent infertility. John McD. W. Bradford, The Hormonal
Treatment of Sexual Offenders, 11 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 159, 161
(1983) (describing nausea, vomiting, and feminization); Kelly & Cavanaugh,
supra note 26, at 102 (discussing feminization and infertility).
44. See Berlin, supra note 39, at 235 (noting that the use of MPA is sup-
ported by a large volume of medical literature, that it is used all over the
country, and that it has been the subject of intense research for over 20
years).
45. Sex offenders treated with MPA typically receive 300 to 400 milligram
doses injected intramuscularly every 7 to 10 days. Bradford, supra note 43, at
163. Doctors can adjust this dosage depending upon its clinical effectiveness
in reducing sex drive and sexually deviant behavior. John Money et al.,
47,XXY and 46,XY Males with Antisocial and/or Sex-Offending Behavior: An-
tiandrogen Therapy Plus Counseling, 1 PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 165,
167 (1975) [hereinafter Antisocial and/or Sex-Offending Behavior]; John
Money et al., Combined Antiandrogenic and Counseling Program for Treat-
ment of 46,XY and 47,XYY Sex Offenders, in HORMONES, BEHAVIOR, AND
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 105, 108, 114-15 (Edward J. Sachar ed., 1976) [hereinafter
Antiandrogenic and Counseling Program]. Without questioning the patient,
who might not be truthful, objective monitoring of the level of testosterone in
the bloodstream can guarantee effectiveness. See Kelly & Cavanaugh, supra
note 26, at 104 (noting that incidence of sexually deviant behavior can be
monitored objectively by measuring serum testosterone level).
Although MPA's mode of action in reducing testosterone, sex drive, and
sexually deviant behavior is not precisely known, it probably resembles the
process reflected infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (decreased testos-
terone production via inhibition of pituitary secretion of luteinizing hormone,
increased hepatic metabolism of testosterone by inducing liver enzymes, and
direct suppressant effect on the cerebral cortex). Conversely, it is conceivable
that MPA's theraputic effect on sexual functioning may be attributed to a
competitive inhibition of testosterone action at central and peripheral recep-
tor sites, a direct effect on the gonads, or a displacement of testosterone from
steroid-binding proteins. Kelly & Cavanaugh, supra note 26, at 103.
46. The endocrine system is one of the major means by which the body
communicates information between different cells and tissues so as to regu-
late body functions. Baxter, supra note 25, at 1. The system uses hormones
to convey its information. Id. at 2.
47. Berlin, supra note 39, at 235; Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 18, at
603; Dietrich Blumer & Claude Migeon, Hormone and Hormonal Agents in the
Treatment of Aggression, 160 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 127, 134 (1975);
Gregory K, Lehne, Treatment of Sex Offenders with Medroxyprogesterone Ace-
tate, in 6 HANDBOOK OF SEXOLOGY: THE PHARMACOLOGY AND ENDOCRI-
NOLOGY OF SEXUAL FUNCTION 516, 516 (J.M.A. Sitsen ed., 1988); McConaghy
et al., supra note 8, at 201-02; Walter J. Meyer III et al., Depo Provera Treat-
ment for Sex Offending Behavior. An Evaluation of Outcome, 20 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 249, 254 & tbl.5 (1992).
48. MPA inhibits the release of the chemical messenger LH, causing the
testes to produce less testosterone. Bradford, supra note 43, at 159; Lehne,
supra note 47, at 516; Melella et al., supra note 13, at 225.
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the drug accelerates the liver's metabolization of testosterone.49
The indirect effect of MPA, therefore, is to bathe the brain with
less of the hormone. Studies indicate that MPA also has a di-
rect tranquilizing effect on the brain.50
MPA's effects on the brain interrupt the fantasies of the
sex offender by diminishing their frequency51 and intensity. 2
Furthermore, MPA's tranquilizing effect on the brain reduces
aggressive behavior generally. 3 Patients typically express re-
lief as the drug suppresses their nagging sexual compulsion
and increases their control over sexual urges.5 4 As a result of
these mechanisms, the patient is much less likely to re-
offend. 5  The legislative proponents of California's chemical
castration statute seized upon this diminished likelihood. 6
49. MPA accelerates the metabolization of testosterone by inducing an
enzyme catalyst. Bradford, supra note 43, at 163; Lehne, supra note 47, at
516.
50. Blumer & Midgeon, supra note 47, at 128; Lehne, supra note 47, at
517; Melella et al., supra note 13, at 225; see Berlin & Meinecke, supra note
18, at 603 (offering support for the proposition that MPA acts directly on the
brain).
51. Bradford, supra note 43, at 163-64; Pierre Gagne, Treatment of Sex
Offenders with Medroxyprogesterone Acetate, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 644, 645-
56 (1981); Lehne, supra note 47, at 518.
52. Lehne, supra note 47, at 518.
53. Blumer & Migeon, supra note 47, at 131-32; Kelly & Cavanaugh, su-
pra note 26, at 102-03; Money et al., Antisocial and/or Sex-Offending Behav-
ior, supra note 45, at 168-70. Because high testosterone correlates with
crimes of aggression, LAWRENCE TAYLOR, BORN To CRIME 95-105 (1984), some
commentators have gone so far as to suggest that male defendants charged
with crimes of aggression should be able to assert high testosterone level as a
defense. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law
Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 80, 128-34 (1994).
54. Gagne, supra note 51, at 645; Melella et al., supra note 13, at 225;
Money, Therapeutic Use, supra note 42, at 354; Money, Treatment, supra note
42, at 168.
55. For studies and commentary illustrating reduced likelihood of reof-
fending, see Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 18, at 603-05, 604 tbl.2; Blumer &
Migeon, supra note 47, at 130; Bradford, supra note 43, at 163; J. Paul Fe-
doroff et al., Medroxy-Progesterone Acetate in the Treatment of Paraphilic
Sexual Disorders, 18 (3/4) J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 109, 117, 118 fig.1,
120 (1992); Gagne, supra note 51, at 645; McConaghy et al., supra note 8, at
202 tbl.2; Meyer et al., supra note 47, at 255-58; Money, Therapeutic Use, su-
pra note 42, at 354-55; Money, Treatment, supra note 42, at 167-69; Money et
al., Antisocial and/or Sex-Offending Behavior, supra note 45, at 174; Money
et al., Antiandrogenic and Counseling Program, supra note 45, at 114-15.
56. See Mendel, supra note 10 (reporting bill sponsor trumpeting MPA's
reduction of child molester recidivism in Europe).
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C. CALIFORNIA'S CHEMICAL CASTRATION LAW
The new California statute57 provides that paroled viola-
tors 8 of specified sex offenses59 where the victim is younger
than thirteen,60 undergo MPA treatment at the court's discre-
tion.6 With twice-convicted offenders, however, MPA treat-
ment is mandatory. 2 In either case, the treatment is in addi-
tion to any other punishment prescribed by law.63
57. Act of Sept. 17, 1996, ch. 596, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2711-12 (West)
(codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West Supp. 1997)). The law reads as
follows:
645. (a) Any person guilty of a first conviction of any offense
specified in subdivision (c), where the victim has not attained 13
years of age, may, upon parole, undergo medroxyprogesterone acetate
treatment or its chemical equivalent, in addition to any other pun-
ishment prescribed for that offense or any other provision of law, at
the discretion of the court.
(b) Any person guilty of a second conviction... shall, upon pa-
role, undergo medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment or its chemical
equivalent ....
(c) This section shall apply to the following offenses:
(1) Subdivision (c) or (d) of Section 286.
(2) Paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 288.
(3) Subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 288a.
(4) Subdivision (a) or (j) of Section 289.
(d) The parolee shall begin ... treatment one week prior to his or
her release from confinement... and shall continue treatments until
the Department of Corrections demonstrates to the Board of Prison
Terms that this treatment is no longer necessary.
(e) If a person voluntarily undergoes a permanent, surgical al-
ternative to hormonal chemical treatment for sex offenders, he or she
shall not be subject to this section.
(f) The Department of Corrections shall administer this section
and implement the protocols required by this section.... These pro-
tocols shall include ... a requirement to inform the person about the
effect of hormonal chemical treatment and any side effects that may
result from it.
Id. § 2. The law also repeals former section 645, a 1923 law allowing judges to
order surgical sterilization of those "adjudged guilty of carnal abuse" of girls
under age 10. Act of May 25, 1923, ch. 224, § 1, 1923 Cal. Stat. 448, 448
(codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 1988) (repealed 1996)).
58. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (a) (West Supp. 1997).
59. Id. § 645(c). The specified sex offenses are sodomy, § 645(c)(1), lewd
or lascivious acts, § 645(c)(2), oral copulation, § 645(c)(3), and penetration of
genital or anal openings by foreign or unknown objects, § 645(c)(4).
60. Id. § 645(a).
61. Id.
62. Id. § 645(b).
63. Id. § 645(a), (b).
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Administered by the California Department of Corrections, 6
MPA treatment begins one week before the offender is released
from prison and continues until the state determines that the
treatment is no longer necessary.6 In all circumstances, the pa-
rolee is informed of the intended effects and possible side effects
of MPA treatment.6 Finally, the statute does not apply to any
offender who volunteers to be surgically castrated.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND
THE LAW OF PAROLE
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE
RIGHT TO GENERATE IDEAS
The First Amendment 68 protects the freedom of speech, of
which the "bedrock principle" is that the government may not
suppress the communication of an idea on the grounds that the
idea is itself objectionable.69  The government can regulate
ideas by placing restrictions on two logically distinct activities.
The first activity is communication (the expression of an idea);
the second, mentation (the formulation of an idea).
1. First Amendment Protection of Communication
Government restrictions on communication may be classi-
fied as categorical restrictions, content-neutral restrictions, or
content-based restrictions. The First Amendment does not
protect categories of speech "of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-
ity." ° These categories are defined by their proscribable con-
tent and may be regulated on that basis7 because their pre-
vention and punishment have never been thought to pose
constitutional problems. 2 Examples of unprotected speech
64. Id. § 645(f).
65. Id. § 645(d).
66. Id. § 645(f).
67. Id. § 645(e).
68. The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
69. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
70. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
71. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992).
72. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
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categories include obscenity,73 defamation,74 and illegal advo-
cacy.75
A restriction on speech is content neutral if it is "justified
without reference to the regulated speech."76 Content-neutral
restrictions, therefore, must serve governmental interests un-
related to the message expressed.77 Legitimate time, place,
and manner restrictions are typical examples of this class. 78 A
content-neutral restriction will be upheld if it is "narrowly tai-
lored to serve a significant governmental interest."79 Narrow
tailoring is satisfied when the government furthers a substan-
tial interest more effectively with the regulation than without
it, 80 but does not regulate in such a manner that a substantial
portion of the burden on speech fails to promote the govern-
ment interest. 81
A restriction is content-based, on the other hand, if the
government targets a particular message or applies a facially-
neutral regulation so as to subject certain speech to disfavored
treatment.8 2 Because content-based regulations raise the spec-
ter of government censorship, they are subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.83 A content-based regulation will be upheld only
where it is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental in-
terest and the regulation is narrowly tailored to that end.
84
73. RA.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957)).
74. Id. (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)).
75. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447-49 (1969) (per curiam).
76. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 293 (1984)).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 791 (noting that content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions are acceptable).
79. Id. (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
80. Id. at 799.
8L Id.
82. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407-08 (rejecting Texas's
claimed interest in preventing breaches of the peace to justify a prohibition on
flag burning, where no disruption had occurred or even threatened to occur);
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 357 & n.15 (1980) (cautioning that the Air
Force's policy requiring preapproval to circulate petitions would give rise to
legitimate First Amendment claims if applied "irrationally, invidiously, or
arbitrarily").
83. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45




The existence of adequate, content-neutral alternatives signifi-
cantly undercuts an assertion that a regulation is necessary. 5
Finally, the First Amendment's protection of communica-
tion extends to expressive conduct as well as speech itself.8 6
Conduct is expressive if the actor intends to convey a particu-
lar message and if it is highly likely that those viewing the
conduct will understand that message.87 Examples of expres-
sive conduct include burning the American flag,88 wearing
black armbands, 9 and staging a sit-in.90
2. First Amendment Protection of Mentation
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether
government restrictions on mentation violate the freedom of
speech, but it has held that the First Amendment protects the
right to receive ideas.9' In striking down a law prohibiting the
private possession of obscene materials, the Court explained
that "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that
a [s]tate has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch."92
From the premise that the First Amendment protects the
right to receive ideas, lower courts have extrapolated a free
speech right to generate ideas.9 According to the argument, if
85. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992).
86. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 406.
89. Id. at 404 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.
393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
90. Id. (citing Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966)).
91. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
92. Id. at 565. The Court similarly rejected, for lack of an empirical basis,
the argument that exposure to obscene materials might lead to deviant sexual
behavior. Id. at 566. An empirical basis does exist, however, for the conclu-
sion that a pedophile's "exposure" to his own fantasies leads to deviant sexual
behavior. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (noting that pedo-
philic fantasies are persistent, recurrent, and have to be fulfilled).
93. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393-94 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding
that the right to generate ideas gives rise to a liberty interest in a pretrial de-
tainee to avoid the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs); Rogers v.
Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1366-68 (D. Mass. 1979) (holding that the right to
generate ideas gives rise to a liberty interest in mental patients at a state
hospital to refuse treatment of psychotropic drugs in a nonemergency), affd in
relevant part and rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Ren-
nie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143-44 (D.N.J. 1978) (holding that forcible
administration of psychotropic drugs does not so disable involuntary patient
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the right to receive ideas is a protected prerequisite to com-
munication, then the right to generate ideas must be a pro-
tected prerequisite as well; the freedom to express ideas is
meaningless without the freedom to generate them.9 4  One
commentator has offered a thesis outlining the core logic:
(1) The [F]irst [A]mendment protects communication of all kinds,
whether in written, verbal, pictorial, or any symbolic form, and
whether cognitive or emotive in nature.
(2) Communication entails the transmission and reception of what-
ever is communicated.
(3) Transmission... necessarily involve[s] mentation on the part
of... the person transmitting ....
(4) It is in fact impossible to distinguish in advance mentation that
will be involved in or necessary to transmission... from mentation
that will not.
(5) If communication is to be protected, all mentation (regardless of
its potential involvement in transmission... ) must therefore be pro-
tected.9"
According to this thesis, communication, or more precisely,
the potential of mentation to be involved in the communicative
process, is the linchpin that brings mentation within the scope
of constitutional protection.96
Moreover, the right to generate ideas may be justified on
the grounds that it is presumptively immoral for government
to substantially alter a person's mentation against his will.97
at state psychiatric hospital that his right to generate ideas is violated); Kai-
mowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 Mental Disability L. Rep. (A.B.A.)
147, 151-52 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973) (holding that state may not perform experi-
mental psychosurgery on involuntarily detained "sexual psychopath" where
surgery could abridge psychopath's First Amendment right to generate ideas).
94. See Kaimowitz, 1 Mental Disability L. Rep. (A.B.A.) at 152 (concluding
that right to generate ideas necessarily follows from right to express ideas).
95. Michael H. Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control:
Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, in BIOLOGICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 49, 54 (Michael H. Shapiro ed.,
1982) (footnote omitted). Disfavored categories of speech are an exception to
the premise stated in (1). Id. at 98-99 n.29
96. Mentation is involved in the communicative process by definition.
Shapiro, Id. at 55. As a matter of logic, we know that some mentation is in-
volved in the communicative process, but we may not know which mentation
is involved in any given circumstance. It is therefore an empirical issue as to
whether a given incursion into mentation indeed affects communication. Id.
97. Id. at 53. This moral thesis is closely related to, but distinct from, the
inviolability-of-the-brain thesis, which argues that because the brain is "the
essence of what is human," this sanctum of "humanly prized emotions and
thought" should remain undisturbed. SAMUEL I. SHUMAN, PSYCHOSURGERY
AND THE MEDICAL CONTROL OF VIOLENCE 97, 98 (1977). The thesis has been
criticized on the grounds that "inviolability of the brain is only a social con-
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The Supreme Court has recognized this moral proposition in a
variety of rulings, 98 although it has never formally found a con-
stitutionally protected right to generate ideas. 99 The courts
that have extended First Amendment protection to antecedent
thought have failed to forge a test outlining the extent to which
the government may control mental processes without violat-
ing the freedom of speech.100
struct, like nudity." Jose M.R. Delgado, Physical Manipulation of the Brain,
in HASTINGS CENTER REP. 11 (Special Supp. May 1973). Yet even if the thesis
"ha[s] no scientific basis and lack[s] any clear articulation in ordinary, nonpo-
etic, nonmetaphorical language," it may nevertheless be justified on the
grounds that "widely shared moral feelings" deserve legal protection. SHUMAN,
supra, at 100.
98. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) ("[In
a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience
rather than coerced by the State."); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 67 (1973) ("The fantasies of a drug addict are his own and beyond the
reach of government .... "); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Our
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the
power to control men's minds."); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (stating that the Bill of Rights safeguards the "freedom to
be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary").
99. In Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), the Supreme Court
held, on substantive and procedural due process grounds, that a state pris-
oner could be treated with psychotropic drugs against his will and without a
hearing. Although the prisoner had raised the First Amendment issue below,
it was not before the Court because the case had originally been decided on
due process grounds. Id. at 218 n.5; id. at 258 n.32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. But see Green, supra note 13, at 19; Peters, supra note 13, at 326. Al-
though both commentators cite Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J.
1978), for a test determining constitutionality according to the intrusiveness
of the government action as measured by the actual effects of a drug on a pa-
tient's ability to think and speak, the court in that case never claimed to cre-
ate such a test. Rather, the court simply compared the case at bar to Kaimow-
itz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 Mental Disability L. Rep. (A.B.A.) 147
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973), and found that the effects of psychotropic drugging
would not "rise to the level of first amendment violations" as experimental
psychosurgery. Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1143-44.
The courts finding a free speech right to generate ideas never invented a
constitutional test because, except for Rennie, they used the First Amendment
issue to implicate other legal questions, without reaching the merits of the
First Amendment issue itself. See, e.g., Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387,
1391-96 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that First Amendment right to generate
ideas gives rise to liberty interest of pretrial detainee to avoid unwanted ad-
ministration of antipsychotic drugs, such that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires state concerns to be sufficiently compelling
to overcome such interest); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1366-67 (D.
Mass. 1979) (holding that generation of ideas is a fidamental right, such
that a state institution for the mentally ill violates the right to privacy, in a
nonemergency situation, if it overrides decisions of involuntary patients to
avoid treatment of mind-altering drugs), affd in relevant part and rev'd in
part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds
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B. THE LAW OF PAROLE: LIMITING PRINCIPLES FOR
CONDITIONS OF RELEASE
A condition of parole 0 1 may be challenged on statutory 2
or constitutional'01 grounds. These two approaches lead, re-
spectively, to "reasonable relationship" and "overbreadth"
tests.
sub noam Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Kaimowitz, 1 Mental Disability
L. Rep. (A.B.A.) at 152 (holding that involuntarily detained "sexual psycho-
path" could not effectively give informed consent to experimental psychosur-
gery because the First Amendment right to generate ideas would be abridged
if the state were to perform the operation). The same is true for the cases
that, without expressly identifying a First Amendment right to generate
ideas, nevertheless recognize a free speech hurdle to state interference with
mental processes. See United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 492 (4th Cir.
1987) (holding that administration of mind-altering medication to pretrial de-
tainee implicates the freedom of thought, giving rise to a liberty interest such
that government justifications must be sufficiently compelling to overcome
such interest); Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456, 1465-67 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that First Amendment interests in being able to think and communi-
cate effectively give rise to a liberty interest such that plaintiff psychiatric
patient treated with electroconvulsive therapy could state a cause of action
under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d
939, 945-47 (3rd Cir. 1976) (holding that plaintiff patient, indefinitely commit-
ted in a state hospital as mentally incompetent to stand trial, could state a
claim for relief under the Fifth Amendment); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp.
915, 929-39 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (holding that First Amendment interests in be-
ing able to think and communicate freely give rise to a liberty interest under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
101. The term "parole" comes from the French parole d'honneur, meaning
"word of honor." NEIL P. COHEN & JAMES J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE § 1.01 (1983 & Supp. 1993). In general, parole is an administra-
five procedure whereby a parole board permits an offender who has already
begun part of a prison term to serve the remaining part of the sentence in the
community, but requires the offender to abide by a set of release conditions
that, if breached, may result in the offender's return to prison for the remain-
ing part of the original sentence. Id.
Parole and probation are conceptually different conditional releases. Id.;
see also Bruce D. Greenberg, Note, Probation Conditions and the First
Amendment: When Reasonableness Is Not Enough, 17 COLuM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 45, 46 n.6 (1981) (cautioning against confusing the two doctrines). Yet
because parole and probation are so similar, COHEN & GOBERT, supra, at 4-5;
Greenberg, supra, at 46 n.6, courts construe the two analogously. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel Demarois v. Farrell, 87 F.2d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 1937)
(adopting the parole law rule that when offender breaks parole, the running of
his sentence is suspended until he is returned to the penitentiary, citing the
identical purposes of the two laws). Likewise, this Note, in analyzing the law
of parole, will use probation case law.
102. See generally COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 101, § 5.09.
103. See generally id. § 5.10.
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1. The Reasonable Relationship Test
Because parole is a creature of statute, a "reasonable rela-
tionship" must exist between a parole condition and the goals
of parole, or the condition may face an ultra vires challenge.' °4
The recognized goals of parole are usually rehabilitation and
public safety,105 although deterrence and condign punishment
are also acceptable ends. 6 Hence, a condition of parole that
relates to the crime for which the offender was convicted or
that involves conduct related to future criminality is likely to
satisfy these goals. 07 For example, in United States v. Hollo-
way,10 8 a defendant who cashed prisoners' refund checks gen-
erated by false tax returns was convicted of conspiracy to make
a fraudulent claim against the United States. 0 9 The Sixth Cir-
cuit upheld a condition of her parole"0 forbidding her from
communicating by mail with prisoners."' The court found that
the reasonable relationship test was satisfied because Hollo-
way would likely be rehabilitated if deprived of the cause and
instrumentality of her crime, and because the restriction would
protect the public from future tax frauds." 2
2. The Overbreadth Test
Alternatively, a condition of parole may be challenged as
unconstitutional. While it is true that parolees "properly are
104. See id. § 5.09 (explaining that a parole condition may violate the stat-
ute authorizing parole if the condition fails to satisfy the jurisdiction's ration-
ale for imposing a parole term).
105. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975)
(en banc).
106. United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1979). Other
permissible goals include incapacitation, retribution, favorable impact on
prison management, equalization of sentencing, and "fine tuning" sentences,
COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 101, § 1.06, although these goals have generally
gone without mention by the courts.
107. Cf People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (1967) (invalidating a
condition of probation forbidding offender from becoming pregnant, on the
grounds that the condition neither related to the defendant's crime, nor to
criminal conduct in general, nor to the offender's likely involvement in future
criminality).
108. 740 F.2d 1373 (6th Cir. 1984).
109. Id. at 1375.
110. The court actually upheld a condition of her probation, but her proba-
tion was contingent upon her first serving six months behind bars. Id. at
1381.




subject to limitations from which ordinary persons are free," 3
the overbreadth doctrine dictates that a condition of parole
must not infringe a parolee's constitutional rights more than is
necessary to achieve government purposes."1 4 Because the gov-
ernment's purposes are the goals of parole, the overbreadth
test requires an investigation similar to the reasonable rela-
tionship test. 5 The functional difference between the two
tests is that the overbreadth analysis eliminates only those
portions of an otherwise valid condition which bear no relation
to parole's goals, while the reasonable relationship test invali-
dates entirely unrelated conditions.11 6 For example, in United
States v. Smith,"'7 a defendant whose income tax returns con-
tained nothing but zeroes and constitutional objections was
properly convicted of failing to file tax returns. 18 The Fifth
Circuit modified a condition of his parole directing him not to
make statements advocating disobedience of "any local, state or
federal law" by replacing that phrase with "the Internal Reve-
nue Code."" 9 While otherwise acceptable, the restriction was
overbroad, the court reasoned, because Smith's convictions
were for tax offenses only. 2 ° Although several courts have
applied the overbreadth test to parole conditions challenged on
First Amendment grounds, 121 no court has applied the test to
parole conditions that burden mentation specifically. 22
113. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975)
(en banc).
114. Greenberg, supra note 101, at 77.
115. Because both tests operate by reference to the goals of parole, several
courts have failed to make a clean distinction between the two tests, or have
treated the constitutional analysis as a second step in the reasonable relation-
ship test. See, e.g., United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir.
1988) (calling the reasonable relationship inquiry a "determin[ation of]
whether the sentencing judge imposed the conditions for permissible pur-
poses," and calling the overbreadth inquiry a "reasonable relationship" test);
United States v. Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373, 1383 (6th Cir. 1984) (concluding
that probation condition is not reasonably related to goals of probation be-
cause it is overbroad); United States v. Smith, 618 F.2d 280, 282 (5th Cir.
1980) (per curiam) (same, except parole).
116. Greenberg, supra note 101, at 79.
117. 618 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
118. Id. at 281-82.
119. Id. at 282.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Lowe, 654 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Patterson, 627 F.2d 760
(5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); United States v. Smith, 618 F.2d 280 (5th Cir.
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III. CALIFORNIA'S CHEMICAL CASTRATION STATUTE:
APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE LAW
OF PAROLE TO MENTATION
Analysis of California's chemical castration statute under
the First Amendment and law of parole is unsatisfactory. The
narrow tailoring requirement of the constitutional test for content-
based restrictions is impossible to apply to the California law.
Because the overbreadth test of the law of parole is function-
ally equivalent to the narrow tailoring test, it too is inade-
quate. The failure of these tests demonstrates that a new con-
stitutional test is needed to subject state infringements on
mentation to First Amendment analysis.
A. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS: REFORMULATING THE RIGHT
TO GENERATE IDEAS AND APPLYING THE TRADITIONAL
FIRST AMENDMENT TESTS TO MENTATION
Before measuring the California statute against the First
Amendment right to generate ideas, an analysis of the right it-
self reveals significant problems in its formulation. These
problems can be overcome by recognizing that the right to gen-
erate ideas is not absolute, but is protected only to the extent
that the First Amendment would protect the communication of
such ideas. Hence, an analysis of the California law must pro-
ceed by determining whether the law restricts mentation for
categorical, content-neutral, or content-based reasons. Al-
though the statute is content-based, the narrow tailoring re-
quirement of the content-based test is impossible to apply.
Thus a First Amendment analysis of chemical castration yields
no conclusion as to its constitutionality.
1. Problems with the Current Formulation of the Right to
Generate Ideas
The first problem with the current formulation of the right
to generate ideas is that the moral principle supporting the
right is not absolute, and may be overcome by a countervailing
1980) (per curiam); United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1979);
Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971); Hyland v. Procunier, 311 F.
Supp 749 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
122. In United States v. Stine, probationer argued that revocation of his
probation was improper because the condition he had violated-required psy-
chological counseling-was void ab initio as an unconstitutional infringement
of his right of mentation. 646 F.2d 839, 841 (3d Cir. 1981). The Third Circuit
rejected this challenge without reaching its merits. Id. at 844-47.
[Vol. 81:16751694
CHEMICAL CASTRATION
moral justification.12 3 Recall that the justification for the right
to generate ideas is the presumption against the government
substantially altering a person's mentation against his will.124
Conversely, the protection of innocent third parties is the
principal moral justification militating against the right to
generate ideas. 12  The significance of this countervailing
proposition is that it provides a competition between princi-
ples, the point at which one principle surpasses the other plot-
ting a point on the line separating the moral from the immoral.
While the pursuit of the moral and the constitutional may
trace divergent paths, the inquiry, at a minimum, establishes a
compelling state interest at odds with a convicted child moles-
ter's right to fantasize. 126
Second, the core thesis behind the right to generate ideas
implies an absurd constitutional test. To recount the argu-
ment, the right to generate ideas is inviolable, in short, be-
cause all communication is protected, 127 because all communi-
cation requires mentation, 128 and because it is impossible to
preselect for disfavored mentation that will be unnecessary to
communication. 129 This argument leaves no avenue for state-
imposed restrictions on the right to generate ideas. 3 ° Hence, a
123. Shapiro, supra note 95, at 53.
124. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (identifying moral theses
against interfering with thought).
125. See Lauren J. Abrams, Comment, Sexual Offenders and the Use of
Depo-Provera, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 565, 570 (1985) (identifying circum-
stances in which the state may compel individuals to take medication). This
justification squares with the Millian principle that "the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any other member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g Co., Inc. 1978)
(1859).
126. A compelling state interest is necessary to satisfy the constitutional
test for content-based restrictions on communication, see supra text accompa-
nying note 84 (identifying the standard of review for content-based restric-
tions), and is more than necessary to satisfy the test for content-neutral re-
strictions. See supra text accompanying note 79 (identifying the lesser
standard for content-neutral restrictions).
127. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. This shorthand is ex-
tracted from premise (1).
128. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. This shorthand is ex-
tracted from premises (2) and (3).
129. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. This shorthand is ex-
tracted from premise (4).
130. Despite phrasing the argument in absolute terms, the argument's
author would permit coercive intrusions on the right to generate ideas where
1997] 1695
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
constitutional test premised on this reasoning would be purely
fact-based; if state action would in fact interfere with a person's
generation of ideas, then such action would be unconstitutional.
This constitutional test is absurd because it simply goes
too far. On the one hand, a state's control over the minds of
public school children would be an obvious constitutional vio-
lation.131 More abstractly, any state-sponsored stimulus affect-
ing perception, such as the wail of a police siren, could inter-
fere with the generation of ideas, thereby triggering the First
Amendment. 3 2 The consequences of this constitutional test, in
either case, are unsatisfactory. One way to resolve the problem
would be to incorporate the maxim "no right is absolute." 33 Al-
ternatively, the right to generate ideas may be salvaged, in a
weaker form, after recognizing that its core thesis, as currently
formulated, is at odds with First Amendment jurisprudence.
A final justification for limiting the right to generate ideas
is that the core thesis in support of the right erroneously states
the law. Contrary to the logic supporting the right to generate
ideas, not all kinds of communication are protected. For exam-
ple, certain categories of speech 134 and expressive conduct'3 5 re-
main unprotected. Moreover, government may restrict speech
and expressive conduct if it satisfies the applicable content-
neutral or content-based test. 36
Correcting this error has important consequences for out-
lining the extent to which the government may control mental
processes without violating the freedom of speech. From the
proposition that not all kinds of communication are protected,
it follows as a corollary that not all infringements of the right
the state's rationale could survive a "compelling state interest" standard of
review. Shapiro, supra note 95, at 55.
131. See id. at 56 (identifying "state-sponsored stimuli" that, absent limit-
ing principles on the right to generate ideas, will trigger a threshold First
Amendment claim).
132. Cf id 56 (observing that the "act of walking through a person's field
of vision" affects their mentation).
133. "It would be idle and trite to say that no right is absolute." Orient
Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 566 (1869).
134. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (identifying permissible
categorical restrictions on speech).
135. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (identifying examples of
permissible expressive conduct).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 79, 84 (outlining the narrow-




to generate ideas are unconstitutional. 37 In other words, the
right to generate ideas is safeguarded only to the extent that
the First Amendment would protect the communication of such
ideas.'38 Because communication remains the linchpin that
brings mentation within the scope of constitutional protection,
therefore, the extent of a pedophile's right to generate sexual
fantasies may be analyzed in terms of categorical, content-
based, and content-neutral restrictions on mentation.
2. Application of Traditional First Amendment Analysis to
California's Chemical Castration Statute
Application of the traditional First Amendment tests to
the California law reveals that the statute properly merits
analysis under a content-based standard. In assessing the
constitutionality of chemical castration according to that stan-
dard, however, the narrow tailoring requirement is impossible
to apply, due to our lack of knowledge about mentation and
communication.
a. Determining the Proper First Amendment Test
The extent of a pedophile's right to generate sexual fanta-
sies may be gauged by determining the nature of the govern-
ment restriction involved in MPA treatment and classifying it
within the existing framework of categorical, content-neutral,
and content-based speech restrictions.
Pedophilic fantasies arguably constitute "obscenity" 3 9 such
that they would be proscribable under a categorical restriction
of obscene speech. The effect of the California statute, in pro-
137. Candace J. Fabri, An Involuntarily Detained Mental Patient's In-
formed Consent Is Invalid for Experimental Psychosurgery, 50 CHi.-KENT L.
REv. 526, 536-37 (1973); Jay Alexander Gold, Comment, Kaimowitz v. De-
partment of Mental Health. Involuntary Mental Patient Cannot Give Informed
Consent to Experimental Psychosurgery, 4 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 207,
219-22 (1974). Case law bears out this conclusion. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein,
462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143-44 (D.N.J. 1978) (holding that the involuntary ad-
ministration of a psychotropic drug is not an unconstitutional infringement on
the right to generate ideas).
138. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 1 Mental Disability L.
Rep. (A.B.A.) 147, 151 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973).
139. For the sake of convenience, "obscene," as used in this Note and as
defined infra text accompanying notes 142-144, refers to that which is obscene
according to the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity in Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) and that which is defined in New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982), as non-obscene but nevertheless categorically pro-
scribable because it involves children engaged in sexual acts.
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viding for MPA treatment of convicted child molesters, 4 , is to
suppress the generation of sexual fantasies.' Since the First
Amendment protects the right to generate ideas only to the ex-
tent that it would protect the communication of such ideas, a
pedophile's right to generate sexual fantasies is protected only
if his communication of such fantasies would be protected. If
communication of pedophilic sexual fantasies constitutes pro-
scribable obscenity, therefore, MPA's interference with the
right to generate ideas poses no First Amendment problems.
This argument fails because pedophilic fantasies probably
do not constitute obscenity for First Amendment purposes.
Where the subject matter of what is communicated involves
children engaged in sexual acts, such communication may only
be prohibited as obscene if it "depicts or describes.., sexual
conduct specifically defined by... state law;"4  if it "appeal[s]
to [a] prurient interest in sex;"'43 and if it "lacks serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value."" It is impossible to
make these determinations in advance for any given pedophilic
fantasy.'45 While classifying pedophilic fantasies as proscrib-
able obscenity is a novel approach, it would be unworkable in
practice.
140. See generally discussion supra Part I.C (describing the operation of
the California statute).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52 (explaining MPA's effects on
the brain).
142. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (as qualified by New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982)).
143. Id. (as qualified by Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764).
144. Id. (as qualified by Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764).
145. A counterargument might be that a pedophile's conviction of child
molestation demonstrates that his motivating fantasy, by definition, satisfies
the obscenity standard. This argument is without merit. The pedophilic fan-
tasy described supra note 27, which fails to meet the definition of obscenity,
demonstrates that a per se rule is inappropriate. Moreover, the argument
does not apply to cases where the act for which the offender is convicted is not
identical to the pedophilic fantasy, such as where the fantasy changes be-
tween the time of the crime and the offender's parole, or where the fantasy
does, for example, have literary value (imagine a pedophile selling the book
rights to his crime story).
Especially troublesome is the application of this fact-intensive test-
traditionally applied to "capturable" media, like magazines and videos-to
fantasies "seen" only by the offender. This test is thus problematic because it
requires analysis of facts known only to the offender, rather than focusing on
the nature of pedophilia itself.
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Pedophilic fantasies arguably constitute illegal advocacy,
another category of unprotected speech. 46  According to the
Supreme Court, the government may prohibit, as illegal advo-
cacy, messages "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and... likely to incite or produce such action."147
It makes no difference that the messages are mental and di-
rected to oneself rather than verbal and directed towards an
audience, since First Amendment protection of mentation ex-
tends only to those ideas that would be protected were they
communicated to others.
The illegal advocacy argument is unworkable because the
"directed to" requirement of the illegal advocacy test is not
provable as applied to pedophilic fantasies. The "directed to"
language requires specific intent on the part of the pedophile;
not an intent that he molest a child, but an intent that his fan-
tasy incite or produce such conduct. In the first place, such in-
tent would be impossible to prove absent an admission by the
actor, significantly restricting application of this test. More
importantly, the feelings of relief reported by MPA-treated sex
offenders, as they gain freedom from deviant fantasies and
take control over their sexual urges, 148 demonstrate that such
intent does not exist. If it did, treated offenders would instead
register disappointment as their fantasy-motivated compul-
sions cease.
It is also questionable whether the "imminency" require-
ment of the illegal advocacy test could be satisfied as applied to
pedophilic fantasies. The ability of pedophiles to stay erotic
impulses149 in the face of persistent, recurrent fantasies 5 ° casts
doubt on the proposition that the lawless action motivated by
such fantasies is properly characterized as imminent. 5'
146. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (citing illegal advocacy as a
category of unprotected speech).
147. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969) (per curiam).
148. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (describing the psycho-
physiological effects of MPA treatment).
149. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (identifying self-gratification
as a technique to quench erotic cravings)
150. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (illustrating the irre-
pressibility of pedophilic fantasies).
151. Courts have determined whether the imminence requirement is met
by reference to the passage of time between the purported incitement and the
lawless action, see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928
(1982) (concluding that acts of violence occurring weeks or months after a civil
rights speech are not imminent); by reference to the instantaneity of the law-
less action, see United States v. Rowlee, 899 F.2d 1275, 1280 (2d Cir. 1990)
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In assessing whether California's suppression of pedophilic
fantasy is content-neutral or content-based, the answer hinges
upon whether the restriction is justified without reference to
the regulated mentation. 5 2  Because the statute targets the
content of the sex offender's fantasy and is only justifiable by
reference to that content, it is a content-based restriction. It is
apparent, for example, that there would be no rationale for
chemical castration if the sex offender were consumed with va-
cation fantasies as opposed to pedophilic fantasies. The con-
tent-based analysis is bolstered by the statute's failure to fall
within the time, place, and manner restrictions typical of con-
tent-neutral regulations.'53 Although the California statute
makes no reference to the content of the sex offender's menta-
tion, the argument proceeds on the theory that a facially-neutral
regulation is being applied so as to subject certain mentation-
pedophilic fantasies-to disfavored treatment.5 4
b. Unsatisfactory Application of the Content-Based Speech
Test's Narrow Tailoring Requirement
Because the California castration statute is justified by
reference to the pedophilic content of child molesters' thoughts,
its constitutionality depends on whether it is necessary to
achieve a compelling governmental interest and whether it is
narrowly tailored to achieve that end.'55 At the outset, Cali-
fornia may claim a compelling interest in preventing the physi-
(concluding that mail fraud, as a slowly-developing wrong, is not imminent);
and by reference to the instantaneity of the medium by which the purported
incitement is conveyed, see Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017,
1022-23 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding no imminence where adolescent dies attempt-
ing auto-erotic activity described in magazine). As applied to pedophilic fan-
tasies, it appears that despite the instantaneity of the medium, pedophiles
can prolong amount of time between the fantastic incitement and the lawless
action.
152. See supra text accompanying note 76 (identifying the critical inquiry
to determine whether a restriction of speech is content-neutral or content-
based). "Mentation" is substituted for "speech" here to make the test nor-
mally applicable to the communicated word applicable to idea-generation as
well. This contortion is crucial to the First Amendment analysis because
communication is the linchpin that brings mentation within the scope of the
First Amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97 (explaining the
linchpin argument).
153. See supra text accompanying note 78 (identifying time, place, and
manner restrictions as typical content-neutral approaches).
154. See supra text accompanying note 82 (identifying methods of content-
based restriction).
155. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (identifying the standard of
review for content-based restrictions).
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cal and emotional harm that convicted child molesters will oth-
erwise inflict on the state's youngest citizens. 56 The issues then
become fact-based questions of necessity and narrow tailoring.
California's chemical castration statute is necessary to di-
minish the recidivism of child molesters. This conclusion relies
upon the absence of adequate, content-neutral alternatives to
achieve the same objective. 57 While extended prison sentences
for child molesters or other alternatives could reduce recidivism,
the inadequacy of a lock-them-up-and-throw-away-the-key ap-
proach"'5 and the success of MPA as compared to rehabilitative
strategies159 permit a finding of necessity.
Narrow tailoring requires that chemical castration pro-
mote a compelling government interest that would be achieved
less effectively absent the California castration statute, but
does not effect the body in such a way that a substantial por-
tion of the regulation of mentation does not advance the gov-
ernment interest. 160 MPA's effectiveness in reducing recidi-
vism guarantees that the first half of this test is satisfied.
Parolees treated with MPA-or at least those parolees who are
156. See supra notes 32, 33 and accompanying text (describing the harm
pedophilia victims suffer); supra text accompanying note 126 (deriving a com-
pelling interest from the moral justification to protect innocent victims). The
state could also assert a significant, if not compelling, governmental interest
in punishing child molesters by way of NPA treatment. The statute itself
implies that IPA treatment is punitive rather than therapeutic or preventa-
tive. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (a) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that MPA
treatment will be in addition to "any other punishment prescribed"). The
problem with relying on punishment as a compelling state interest is that it
would swallow all constitutional liberties, as deprivation of a liberty is itself
punishment.
157. See supra text accompanying note 85 (explaining that the existence of
alternative means to secure state interests demonstrates that the policy fac-
ing challenge is not narrowly tailored).
158. This approach is inadequate not because it would fail to reduce re-
cidivism. It would probably accomplish the governmental interest more com-
pletely than would chemical castration. Instead, its inadequacy stems from
abandoning competing policy preferences for spending as little revenue as is
necessary on new prisons, preventing prison overcrowding, and reintegrating
offenders into mainstream society. The point is that the necessity require-
ment does not completely invalidate legislative policy preferences by demand-
ing that the means chosen to effectuate the governmental interest be abso-
lutely necessary, but only that they be "reasonably necessary." R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992).
159. Compare supra text accompanying notes 35, 36 (citing the failure of
rehabilitative approaches and accompanying high rates of recidivism), with
supra text accompanying notes 52-57 (explaining why MPA treatment works).




pedophiles or have aggressive tendencies-will be significantly
less likely to subject other children to physical or emotional
harm.
The second half of the test, which is designed to ensure
that state restrictions are not overinclusive with regard to the
amount of mentation that is burdened, poses considerable diffi-
culty for California's chemical castration law. Examination of
the facts reveals that California's remedy is overinclusive with
respect to those paroled child molesters who are neither pedo-
philes nor prone to aggression. Because MPA treatment is
nontherapeutic for those who molest children, for example, due
to hallucination or mental retardation, any interference with
such parolees' mentation fails to effectuate the governmental in-
terest and is therefore an unconstitutional burden on their right
to generate ideas. 161
With respect to parolees who are pedophiles or prone to
aggression, the overinclusiveness requirement of the narrow
tailoring test is impossible to apply. The problem here is our
state of knowledge regarding the nexus between mentation and
communication, and the effect of MPA on that nexus. The dif-
ficulty arises because some mentation is involved in the com-
municative process, but it is impossible to ascertain which
mentation is involved in any given circumstance, or which
mentation is interrupted by MPA.162 Perhaps MPA only bur-
dens mentation necessary to create pedophilic fantasies, as op-
posed to mentation necessary to communicate. Perhaps the
converse is true. Because it is impossible to make these de-
terminations, the narrow tailoring test is inadequate as ap-
plied to the California statute and yields no conclusion as to its
constitutionality.
B. ANALYSIS UNDER THE LAW OF PAROLE
Thus far the analysis has treated convicted child molesters
as if they are to be accorded the same First Amendment rights
as the population at large. In recognition that parolees are
161. Because there is no rational basis for applying the statute to paroled
child molesters who are neither pedophiles nor prone to aggression, the law
would fail any rational relationship test, much less the strict scrutiny re-
quired of content-based restrictions.
162. See supra text accompanying note 95 (quoting premise (4) of the the-
sis supporting free speech right to generate ideas); supra note 96 (identifying




properly subject to conditions that infringe otherwise inviolable
constitutional rights,16 the law of parole should be applied to
California's chemical castration statute to determine its consti-
tutionality. Unfortunately, the reasonable relationship1" and
overbreadth165 tests do not resolve the tailoring dilemma from
First Amendment analysis. 166
1. Application of the Reasonable Relationship Test
Because parolees-or at least those parolees who are pe-
dophiles or have aggressive tendencies-treated with MPA will
be significantly less likely to subject additional children to
physical or emotional harm, the condition of parole is rea-
sonably related to the goals of rehabilitation and public
safety. 67 This conclusion is supported by the nexus between
the condition and conduct related to past and future criminal-
ity.168 Moreover, the reasonable relationship test should pose
no problem here because the inquiry is conducted to determine
whether statutory authority exists for the parole condition in
question. 169 In the case of chemical castration, the condition is
specifically authorized by California law.
2. Unsatisfactory Application of the Overbreadth Test
The overbreadth test, like the narrow tailoring require-
ment, is impossible to apply to the chemical castration statute.
This should come as no surprise because the two tests are
functionally equivalent; they both allow only so much in-
fringement of constitutional rights as is necessary to achieve
government's goals. 70 As with narrow tailoring, the difficulty
163. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975)
(en banc).
164. See discussion supra Part H.B.1 (discussing the reasonable relation-
ship doctrine).
165. See discussion supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the overbreadth doc-
trine).
166. See discussion supra Part Im.A.2.b (explaining why the content-based
narrow-tailoring test is appropriate but impossible to apply to California's
chemical castration statute).
167. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (identifying public safety
and rehabilitation as twin goals of parole).
168. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (arguing that the reason-
able relationship nexus is likely to be satisfied by a parole condition relating
to the parolee's past or future conduct).
169. See supra text accompanying note 104 (characterizing the reasonable
relationship test as an ultra vires inquiry).
170. Compare supra note 81 and accompanying text (identifying non-
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arises from knowing that some mentation is involved in the
communicative process, but not knowing which mentation is
involved in any given circumstance, or which mentation is in-
terrupted by MPA. This lack of knowledge makes it impossible
to determine whether the condition of parole limits parolees'
First Amendment rights more than is necessary to achieve the
government's purposes.
IV. REMEDYING THE UNSATISFACTORY APPLICATION
OF THE NARROW TAILORING AND OVERBREADTH
TESTS: A NEW TEST TO DETERMINE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF STATE
ACTION INTERFERING WITH MENTATION
The impossibility of applying the narrow tailoring and
overbreadth tests to the chemical castration statute demon-
strates that a new test is necessary to make content-based
state infringements on mentation susceptible to constitutional
analysis. The necessity of a new test is not limited to circum-
stances where state infringement on mentation is content-
based. The constitutional test for content-neutral restrictions
likewise incorporates a narrow tailoring requirement' 7' that
will fail if applied to state action burdening mentation. So long
as no new test is developed, the right to generate ideas will
enjoy none of the protections accorded the right to communi-
cate them.
A new test should satisfy at least four objectives. First, a
new test should recognize the absurdity of protecting indi-
viduals from every possible interference with mentation, no
matter how slight. 172  Second, a new test should retain some
semblance of its First Amendment background so that, when
applied, it does not achieve results that stray radically away
from the intuitive results of a narrow tailoring analysis.'7
3
Third, in recognition of the principle that those convicted of
overinclusiveness requirement of narrow tailoring) with supra note 114 and
accompanying text (identifying non-overinclusiveness requirement of the
overbreadth test).
171. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (identifying the stan-
dard of review for content-neutral restrictions).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 130-132 (providing examples dem-
onstrating the absurdity of a test absolutely protecting idea generation).
173. Measuring the success of a new test against this goal may be difficult,
because the task requires an intuition as to where the constitutional line
would be drawn were the narrow tailoring test functional in the first place-a
condition contrary to fact.
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crimes do not enjoy the same constitutional protections as oth-
ers,174 a new test should not protect equally the First Amend-
ment rights of convicted and nonconvicted persons.17 1 Finally,
a new test should apply universally to state action interfering
with mentation so that the content-based and content-neutral
hemispheres of state regulation may be measured against the
First Amendment. 176
In light of the foregoing principles, content-based, coercive
state action interfering with mentation should only be allowed
where all of the following conditions are met. First, the person
aggrieved by the state action interfering with mentation has
been convicted of a crime. Second, the state action is directed
toward ameliorating a condition that has significantly contrib-
uted to such criminality. Third, the condition the state seeks
to ameliorate is corrigible, and the method the state employs to
ameliorate the condition neither carries with it an unreason-
able degree of psychological risk nor is regarded as experimen-
tal by the relevant scientific community. Fourth, the state ac-
tion that incidentally or directly interferes with mentation is
supported by a compelling state interest and is necessary to
achieve that interest. In the case of content-neutral, coercive
state action interfering with mentation, the fourth prong would
require only that the state action interfering with mentation be
supported by a substantial state interest. A threshold First
Amendment claim that the government has violated an indi-
vidual's right to generate ideas would require that the individ-
ual is substantially unable to resist the psychic effects of state
action interfering with mentation.
174. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (observing that parolees
are properly subject to restrictions from which others are free).
175. This goal responds to the identical constitutional scrutiny of the First
Amendmenfs narrow tailoring test and the law of parole's overbreadth test.
See supra text accompanying note 170 (comparing the narrow tailoring and
the overbreadth test). A criticism of the goal might be that although the con-
stitutional test is identical, the underlying state action to which the test is
applied is not, and so convicted persons do sacrifice more constitutional liber-
ties than do non-convicted persons. Although this criticism is accurate, it
does not follow that the procedural application of the constitutional tests
should not discriminate as well.
176. This goal is desirable because the need for a new test extends to con-
tent-neutral policies as well. See supra note 171 and accompanying text




This proposal17 7 accomplishes the goals required of the new
test. For those who have not been convicted of a crime, the un-
certainty as to whether a state activity interfering with men-
tation is narrowly tailored is resolved in favor of the person ag-
grieved by such activity. For those who have been convicted,
the uncertainty is resolved in favor of the state. This dual ap-
proach satisfies the goal of differential treatment. In combi-
nation with the requirements that the individual be convicted
of a crime and that the state action be directed toward amelio-
rating a condition which has significantly contributed to such
criminality, the compelling interest requirement contemplates
that the parolee or probationer has probably committed a fel-
ony and that, absent state activity, the person will continue to
impose significant social costs upon the community.
The goal that the new test maintain some semblance of
First Amendment underpinnings is supported by the compel-
ling interest and necessity standards and the requirements
that state action be directed toward ameliorating a condition
that has significantly contributed to criminality, that the con-
dition the state seeks to ameliorate is corrigible, and that the
method the state employs to ameliorate the condition neither
carries with it an unreasonable degree of psychological risk nor
is regarded as experimental by the relevant scientific commu-
nity. Specifically, the compelling interest and necessity re-
quirements match the current compelling interest and neces-
sity requirements of content-based restrictions. Fulfillment of
the other requirements protects against interference with men-
tation where such interference is unlikely to achieve govern-
mental goals or is likely to interfere with mentation much more
than is necessary to achieve such purposes. Hence, it ap-
proximates the narrow tailoring requirement of the test gov-
erning content-based restrictions.
Insofar as the improved test addresses both content-
neutral and content-based restrictions on mentation, it satis-
fies the goal of universal applicability.17 8 Moreover, the narrow
177. The proposed test was inspired by a proposal to compromise the "right
to be unhealthy," SHUMAN, supra note 97, at 205, and by commentary offering
the optimal conditions under which the state may prescribe "internal punish-
ment." Connie S. Rosati, A Study of Internal Punishment, 1994 Wis. L. REV.
123, 128-36.
178. The new test is universally applicable even though it does not address
categorical restrictions on mentation. Where a categorical restriction is found, it
does not usurp constitutional analysis under the content-neutral/content-based
dichotomy. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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tailoring requirement of the content-neutral test necessitates
that the new test apply to content-neutral restrictions to avert
the same narrow tailoring dilemma encountered by analysis of
mentation under the content-based test. By requiring, under a
content-neutral analysis, that state action interfering with
mentation be supported only by a substantial state interest,
the new test likewise retains the First Amendment balance of
the old test in furtherance of the goal of maintaining some
semblance of First Amendment underpinnings.
Finally, the threshold standard for stating a First Amend-
ment claim under the right to generate ideas recognizes that
not every possible interference with mentation will merit a
constitutional remedy. By requiring that an individual be sub-
stantially unable to resist the psychic effects of state action in-
terfering with mentation, de minimus or persuasive intrusions,
like police sirens or public school instruction, are distinguished
from coercive mind control.
A primary criticism of the new test and of limiting the
right to generate ideas generally might be that individuals
should be absolutely free from government meddling with their
thoughts. In the first place, this argument simply goes too far,
as demonstrated by the absurd results it would generate."9 A
respectable fall-back position might be, however, that even if
de minimus or persuasive instances of government interference
with mentation are not absolutely forbidden under the First
Amendment, instances of coercive mind control should be. Ac-
cording to the argument, it is unacceptable to place restrictions
on mentation by reference to the restrictions that government
may legitimately place on communication, because there is a
difference between thinking and speaking. Likewise, it is un-
acceptable to place restrictions on mentation to prevent lawless
action, because there is a difference between thinking and
acting. According to the argument, the danger in permitting
coercive mind control is that individuals will be punished for
their thoughts which are separate from their proscribable ac-
tions.
This criticism is misplaced. The new test only permits co-
ercive mind control where it is necessary to prevent acts which
themselves may be prohibited, and where that necessity has
been demonstrated by an individual's past criminality. Hence,
179. See supra text accompanying notes 131-132 (providing examples dem-
onstrating the absurdity of a test absolutely protecting idea generation).
17071997]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
where an individual's mentation motivates lawless action and
where the actor is unable to independently suppress that moti-
vation, the individual's behavior has already erased the dis-
tinction between thinking and acting. 180
Moreover, under this test, government may never regulate
ideas solely because it could prohibit their communication; the
state must also demonstrate that such regulation is necessary
to prevent prohibited conduct. This additional requirement
explains why the new test is warranted, notwithstanding the
difference between thinking and speaking. To the extent that
government has traditionally been permitted to regulate speech
and not mentation, such regulation has been justified by the po-
tential harmful effects of the former. This distinction is erased
by the likely harmful effects of certain thoughts when an indi-
vidual is unable to control the compulsions they induce.
81
Application of the proposed test to California's chemical
castration statute produces mixed results. Because the Cali-
fornia law only applies to convicted child molesters, 18 2 it meets
the first prong of the test. Second, because MPA treatment is
directed toward ameliorating the pedophilic fantasies and ag-
gressive tendencies that lead to child molestation,"3 it satisfies
the second prong of the test, but only for those parolees for
whom pedophilia or a tendency to aggression actually led to
criminality.184  Third, the condition which MPA treatment
seeks to correct is corrigible,'85 and MPA treatment is neither
180. Where thought does not motivate conduct, and the state nevertheless
infringes mentation, the state is not suppressing ideas in order to restrict
conduct, but is doing so only incidentally. The criticism does not apply in this
circumstance because there is no danger that individuals are being punished
for their thoughts.
181. As to the related question why regulation of thought should be gov-
erned by a test formulated by reference to the protection of communication, as
opposed to being governed by a test formulated by reference to permissible
conduct, it is sufficient to answer that the right to generate ideas is protected
by the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee.
182. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(a), (b) (West Supp. 1997).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 48-55 (describing the intended ef-
fects of MPA treatment).
184. This result is consistent with the portion of the narrow tailoring test
that is applicable to the California chemical castration statute. Like the old
test, the improved test forbids state action interfering with mentation where
no government interest may plausibly be achieved by such action. See supra
text accompanying note 161 (applying narrow tailoring to MPA treatment
where such treatment would be non-theraputic).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26 (demonstrating that deviant
behavior may be a function of the level of testosterone in the bloodstream).
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experimental' 86 nor does it carry with it an unreasonable de-
gree of psychological risk.187 Finally, the compelling interest
and necessity requirements have already been established. 188
In sum, application of the improved test would invalidate Cali-
fornia's chemical castration statute as applied to those parolees
who are neither pedophiles nor harbor aggressive tendencies,
but it would uphold the statute as applied to those parolees
who are pedophiles or harbor aggressive tendencies. The obvi-
ous solution is for California to limit chemical castration to
those child molesters who are pedophiles.
CONCLUSION
Just as the right to communicate ideas is protected under
First Amendment jurisprudence, so must the antecedent right
to generate ideas be protected. While traditional free speech
analysis works well to distinguish between protected and un-
protected speech, that framework of analysis does not transfer
well to mentation, because it is impossible, under the current
state of knowledge, to differentiate mentation which deserves
First Amendment protection from mentation which does not.
Analysis of California's new chemical castration law bears out
this conclusion and dictates an improved test limiting the ex-
tent to which state action may interfere with mentation. When
faced with government intrusions on the right to generate
ideas, courts should adopt this improved test which, as applied
to the California law, upholds the innovative policy as against
a convicted pedophile's right to fantasize.
186. See supra text accompanying note 44 (explaining why MPA treatment
is no longer experimental).
187. See Kelly & Cavanaugh, supra note 26, at 104-05 (providing a com-
prehensive list of complications and side effects).
188. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (offering a compelling jus-
tification for chemical castration); supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text
(demonstrating the necessity of chemical castration).
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